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COMMENTS
APPLYING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1969 TO ONGOING FEDERAL PROJECTS
by Burk E. Bishop
One of the more significant additions to the federal court dockets is the
environmental suit. A federal judge recently gave judicial recognition to the
fact that "[elcology looms as the issue of the decade."' This concern with the
environment is reflected in all of our national institutions. It has been said
"that no man [can run] for national office without declaring himself to be
an environmentalist ...."2 Political concern is reflected in an impressive array
of new environmental statutes, on both the federal and state level.' The execu-
tive branch has voiced its concern for the preservation and restoration of the
ecosystem.4 The courts are faced with "the beginning of what promises to be
a flood of new litigation,"5 primarily under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA).' It is some of this litigation that will be discussed in this
Comment.
I. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
It is advisable to put the various problems into the perspective of an actual
case. Sierra Club v. Froehlke7 is presently pending in the Southern District
of Texas, and is a fairly representative example of the problems to be examined.
The plaintiffs joined in opposition to the Trinity River Navigation Project
and, more particularly, the Wallisville Dam which is currently under con-
struction near the mouth of the Trinity. They claimed that the project as a
whole will destroy bottom land and trees, drive various species of fish and
wildlife from their natural habitats, and foster industrialization along the canal
which will in turn "reduce the free-flowing Trinity River to a series of placid
pools with stagnant and polluted water."' The Wallisville Dam, according to
1 Camp May County Chapter, Inc. v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D.N.J. 1971).
'Kitzmiller, Federal Legislation: What's Happening on Capitol Hill, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW 61 (C. Hassett ed. 1971).
3 In addition to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-47
(1970), see such federal laws as the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, tit. I, 84
Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of 33, 42 U.S.C.), and such state laws as the Thomas
J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 691.1201-.1207 (1970). For a more complete discussion of the federal laws involved
in the environmental area, see text accompanying notes 17-50 infra.
4 Environmental Message, reprinted in ENV. REP.: FED. LAWS 21:0321 (1971).
'Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
642 U.S.C. § 4321-47 (1970).
'Civil No. 71-H-983 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
8The plaintiffs include several conservation organizations from the Houston area, a
commercial fishermen's organization, and landowners along the lower Trinity. The obvious
reason for the joinder of such a diverse group is to insure standing to sue. The recent Su-
preme Court decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972), while denying
the standing of the Sierra Club to challenge the Mineral King Mountain resort complex,
laid out fairly clear criteria for standing in environmental suits. For additional discussion of
the law of standing in the environmental context, see J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 102-07 (1971); Sive, Availability of Injunctive and Declarative
Relief in Private Suits, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 21, 24-30 (C. Hassett ed. 1971).
'Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, Civil No. 71-H-983 (S.D. Tex.
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the plaintiffs, will destroy nursery grounds for various species of fish, render
the area less useful for hunting and fishing, and generally reduce the area to
a polluted lake.10 The plaintiffs alleged violations of both the procedural re-
quirements of the NEPA and the substantive duties which they contend the
Act creates.
The original defendants were the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Engi-
neers, and the District Engineer. The Trinity River Authority of Texas inter-
vened as a defendant to protect its interest in the project. The Authority's
answer revealed that the Trinity River Project and the Wallisville Dam are
separate and distinct projects. The dam was authorized by Congress in 1962
and the Navigation Project in 1965. The Authority noted that construction of
the dam began in 1968 and is now approximately one-half complete, while
other elements of the Wallisville system have been completed. However, the
Trinity Project is still in the early stages of planning. An environmental impact
statement as required by the NEPA was filed regarding the dam, despite the
Authority's contention that the Act is not applicable. The Authority also
cited the economic, social, and environmental benefits of both the dam and
the Navigation Project."
This case is illustrative of the two major issues with which this Comment
will deal. First, should the provisions of the Act be applied to projects which
were begun before its passage? The Wallisville Dam was authorized in 1962,
and construction on it is now half complete. The Trinity River Navigation
Project was authorized in 1965, but little money has yet been spent and little
planning accomplished. Should the Act be applied to one or both of these
projects; and, if applied to both, should it be to the same extent or with
recognition of the respective stages of completion? Second, if the provisions
of the Act are applied, what issues are reviewable by the court? May the court
examine only compliance with the procedural requirements of the Act, or can
the plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of the environmental statement and the
agency decision to proceed despite harmful environmental consequences? The
resolution of each of these issues is dependent upon the answer to the other.
Since the court's latitude in reviewing agency action under the Act helps define
the issue of retroactive application of the Act, the scope of review will be dis-
cussed first.
II. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. Classifying Environmental Insults
One can scarcely deny that our environment is in trouble. One author states
that the gist of the ecological problem is the pursuit of a goal of infinite
growth on a finite planet." Others state that the ultimate solution to environ-
1971). Opposition to the Trinity River Project is not new, nor has it been based exclusively
on environmental concerns. See Drew, Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers,
ATLANTIC, Apr. 1970, at 53.
"
0 Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 9, at 7-8.
" See section III infra.
12 Motion of the Trinity River Authority To Intervene as a Defendant, Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, Civil No. 71-H-983 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
" TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 63.
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mental decay can only be found in population control. The estimates range
from inconvenience to catastrophe, but there is no doubt that the problem does
exist, and that it deserves some place on the ladder of national priorities.
The threats to the environment generally fall into four main classes.
The first class consists of degradable water pollutants and solid wastes. These
are the most easily recognized, and the least difficult to solve from a technical
standpoint. The second class, non-persistent air pollutants, is similarly sus-
ceptible to technical solutions, although these pollutants often present more
difficult problems. The third class, persistent toxic pollutants, such as DDT,
is less vulnerable to our present technology, and such pollutants may have only
speculative effects. The final class of pollutants includes all those activities
which do not themselves introduce pollutants, but nevertheless cause major
environmental changes. A dam and power plant, for example, result in ir-
reversible changes in land use, alter wildlife distribution, and produce waste
heat which must be dissipated into the biosphere. This last class is the most
difficult with which to cope, since it involves problems which do not become
evident until many years have passed, and demands solutions entailing serious
social sacrifices.14
B. The Place of the NEPA in the Scheme of Environmental Improvement
To interpret the NEPA intelligently, its place in the present scheme of
regulation must be identified and the class of environmental insults to which
it was addressed isolated. The conceptual organization of the Act is threefold;
it includes a declaration of a national policy of environmental preservation, a
procedure by which federal agencies are to report their observance of these
goals in decision-making, and the institutionalization of environmental con-
cerns in the Council on Environmental Quality.1
The significant portion of the Act as far as environmental litigation is
concerned is section 102(C).'" That section requires an impact statement to
'
4 Rathjens, National Environmental Policy: Goals and Priorities, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL: PRIORITIES, POLICIES, AND THE LAW 11, 22 (F. Grad ed. 1971). See also S.
BLOOM, HEAT-A GROWING WATER POLLUTION PROBLEM 1-3 (Environmental Law Re-
porter Monograph No. 4, 1970); John, Thermal Pollution: A Potential Threat to Our
Aquatic Environment, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 287 (1971).
"5Reilly, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Highway Program:
Merging Administrative Traffic, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 26 (1970).
1842 U.S.C. § 4332c (1970). Pertinent provisions are as follows:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach . . . in decisionmaking
which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and techni-
cal considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
[Vol. 26
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be submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality for every report on
legislation or "other major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
human environment." The statement must set out all possible effects of the
project on the environment and the possible alternatives to the project. The
lack (or insufficiency) of the impact statement is at the heart of virtually every
case decided under the NEPA.
Other Statutes Concerning Environmental Quality. There are a great many
environmental statutes on the books. Many of the statutes are technical and
regulatory, having been directed at class one pollutants. Examples of such
statutes are the recent Clean Water Restoration Act of 196617 and the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970.18 This latter law, along with the Rivers
and Harbors Act19 and the statutes implementing the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,"0 are specifically directed
to the much publicized problem of oil spills. The Federal Water Pollution
Control Acte' is the general source of water pollution standards. The Refuse
Act of 1899" prohibits the discharge of refuse into navigable waters without
a permit, and has recently been revived as a tool of environmental litigation."'
Ordinary garbage is the subject of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.' These
statutes are narrower than the NEPA. They attempt to remove pollutants
which have no social value, rather than to dictate a balancing between social
cost and social benefit.
There are also a number of statutes which approach the problem of water
quality and use in a more general manner. For example, the Delaware River
Basin Compact' and the Hudson River Basin Compact Act" prescribe both
water quality and the allocation of water between commercial use, aesthetic
pleasure, and recreational enjoyment. The Federal Watershed Protection and
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has juris-
diction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appro-
priate Federal, State, and local agencies . . . shall be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public . . . and
shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes ....
'
7Pub. L. No. 89-753, title II, S 211(a), 80 Star. 1252-54, as amended, 33 U.S.C.
1151-75 (1970).
1884 Stat. 91, amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. SS 1151-75
(1970).
'933 U.S.C. 5§ 401-65 (1970); see United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d
Cir. 1952).
. 33 U.S.C. §5 1001-15 (1970). See also the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970), which applies to wells outside navigable waters, and the Oil
Pollution Act of 1934, ch. 316, §§ 1-5, 7, 8, 43 Stat. 604-06, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §
1161 (1970), which prescribes penalties for the negligent discharge of oil.2133 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
233 U.S.C. § 407a (1970).
2 See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); see Note, The Refuse Act
of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 782 (1971).
'Pub. L. No. 89-272, as amended by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. S
1857a-18571, 3251-54, 3256-59 (1970).
'Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
2 Pub. L. No. 89-605, § 1 (Sept. 26, 1966).
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Flood Prevention Acte also expands treatment of water usage. The Water
Resources Research Act of 1964' and the Water Resources Planning Acte'
are similarly designed to involve the federal government beyond the simple
removal of pollutants. These laws mandate a balancing approach much like
that of the NEPA.
There are also a number of statutes addressed more or less specifically to
non-persistent air pollutants. The Air Quality Act of 1967,0 as amended by the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970,1 establishes standards and provides for a
limited enforcement procedure. The National Emissions Standards Act
empowers the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to establish
criteria for automobile exhaust emissions.' Noise pollution has been recognized
in an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act which requires the Federal
Aviation Agency to prescribe rules for the control of aircraft noise and sonic
booms,' and is the subject of the recent Noise Pollution and Abatement Act
of 1970.' These statutes are also technical and fairly narrow. They attempt
to minimize environmental harm rather than to balance harm with benefit.
At least two statutes are addressed to the particular problems of persistent
toxins. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act" requires
registration with the Department of Agriculture of all toxins for insect, pest,
and fungus control. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act7 proscribes the
use of pesticides, unless their safety factor is within limits established by HEW.
Several statutes regulate the more general issue of man's overall relationship
to the environment, and, thus, begin to deal with the particular problems of
class four pollutants. Statutes which require some sort of balancing between
economic development and environmental, aesthetic, and recreational consider-
ations include the Federal Power Act,' the Department of Transportation Act
of 1966,' and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.' Protection of fish and
2 16 U.S.C. S 1001-07 (1970).
2842 U.S.C. 1961-61c (1970).2942 U.S.C. 1962-62d (1970).
2042 U.S.C. g 1857a-18571 (1970).
"1 Id.; see Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Responses to Felt Necessities,
22 HASTINGs L.J. 661, 668-74 (1971).
1242 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
"
3Regulations may be found at 37 Fed. Reg. 5634 (1972).
'49 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (1970). FAA rules on noise abatement may be found at 14
C.F.R. pt. 36 (1972). The Department of Transportation is also directed to study and pro-
mulgate rules on noise abatement by the Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. S 1653 (a)(1971).
3142 U.S.C. 55 1858-1858a (1970).
207 U.S.C. 55 135-135k (1970).
3721 U.S.C. 5 301-92 (1970).
816 U.S.C. 55791-825 (1970). Section 10(a) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 5 803(a) (1970),
requires the Federal Power Commission to consider public benefit, including recreation, in
granting licenses for hydroelectric plants.
949 U.S.C. 551651-59 (1970).
4023 U.S.C. 55101-141 (1970). These last two statutes all provide for scenic, historical,
and recreation planning in highway construction. Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway
Act (§ 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act) requires that before park land
can be used for highway construction, the responsible agency must make a determination
that (1) no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of park land exists; and (2) that
all possible planning to minimize harm to park land has been done. This finding is occasion-
ally referred to as the § 138 or § 4(f) statement. See Gray, Environmental Requirements
of Highway and Historic Preservation Legislation, 20 CAT-. U.L. RnV. 45 (1970).
[Vol. 26
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wildlife is contemplated by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,' the
Migratory Bird Act," the Anadromous Fish Act of 1965,' and the Endangered
Species Act." The general question of the allocation of land use between com-
mercial productivity and conservational or recreational activity is regulated by
the Wilderness Act of 1964,4' the Classification and Multiple Use Act of
1964,4" and the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.', The Environmental Quality
Improvement Act of 197 0' and the Environmental Education Acte reflect a
desire for further recognition and understanding of environmental problems.
The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970"0 requires a general analy-
sis of ecological factors in airport construction in a fashion similar to the
NEPA. In fact, all of these statutes are conceptually similar to the NEPA.
They are concerned with a balance of the need for a particular resource on one
hand and the resultant ecological decay on the other. Rather than minimum
standards being set, which presupposes a socially acceptable level of environ-
mental harm, the decision must be justified by the now familiar balancing
procedure.
The NEPA's Role in the Statutory Scheme. It seems that the NEPA was di-
rected basically at class four pollutants. Like the statutes already mentioned, it
essentially requires a balancing of environmental effects against social and
economic benefits. The technical problems of classes one, two, and to a certain
extent, three, can and should be solved by technical statutes. Few would dispute
the proposition that a federal project should be designed and built to produce
as little water and air pollution as possible; the major issue under the NEPA
is whether the project should be constructed at all. Activities which introduce
new substances into the biosphere can be adequately regulated without impact
statements. The NEPA is directed at those activities which, while they may
not introduce pollutants into the biosphere, do produce profound effects on the
environment.
The NEPA should be interpreted with the particular problems of class four
environmental insults in mind. It should be recognized that a fairly delicate
balancing of economic benefit as opposed to environmental detriment is in-
volved, and that in many cases the threat to the ecology will be distant and
not easily recognized. The Act will not condone an insult to the environment
on a mere showing that a certain project will produce a socially desirable
benefit. The solution to the problems presented by class four pollutants must
necessarily entail social and economic sacrifices at some point.
C. Judicial Review Under the NEPA
The Reviewable Issues. The traditional role of the courts in reviewing the de-
4116 U.S.C. §5 661-65 (1970).
42 16 U.S.C. §5 715-715r (1970).
-16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757f (1970).
"16 U.S.C. S 668aa (1970).
4'16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970).
4643 U.S.C. §§ 1411-18 (1970).
4743 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).4842 U.S.C. §5 4371-74 (1970).
4920 U.S.C. §§ 1531-36 (1970).
0 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-03, 1711-27 (1970).
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cisions of administrative agencies is narrow, and this appears to be true under
the NEPA despite the insistence of some commentators that a broader scope
of review is necessary. At least three issues seem to be reviewable in various
degrees:
(1) Agency discretion not to comply with the Act;
(2) Compliance with the procedural requirements of the Act; and,
(3) "Substantive" review of the sufficiency of the statement and the pro-
priety of the decision.
The question of an agency's discretion not to comply with the NEPA has
been raised in three contexts. In some cases, agencies have declined to conform
to the Act on the strength of their determination that the action was not
"major" or the environmental effects not significant. Some courts have allowed
such decisions to stand, 1 while others have emphatically denied the existence
of any agency discretion to make such determinations."2 Other cases have con-
sidered agency discretion to defer to the expertise of other agencies, the ap-
parent requirements of other statutes, or environmental studies previously
accomplished. Opinions have ranged from a condemnation of one agency's
"abdication,"" to the acceptance of any carefully done environmental study
as complying with the NEPA." The mandates of seemingly conflicting statutes
have been held to be both an excuse for noncompliance with the NEPA and
to be secondary to the NEPA." A third area in which the question has been
raised is the timing of the statement. The argument that an impact statement
would be premature or otherwise ill-timed has been accepted by some courts5 '
and rejected by others.'
Because of the divergence in the cases, it is difficult to state any firm rule
" Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
held that the determination that an impact statement was not required for an apartment
complex could be overturned only if arbitrary and capricious. Davis v. Morton, 335 F. Supp.
1258 (D.N.M. 1971), specifically approved a determination that a sale of Indian leases
was not a "major" project. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me.
1972), gave similar approval to a determination that the environmental effects of a practice
amphibious assault would not be significant.
'IsScherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971); accord, Businessmen v. D.C.
City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1883 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), struck down AEC rules which removed from the balancing
process any environmental factor as to which another responsible agency had certified that
its own standards had been met.
"Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 Env. Rep. Cas. 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970); accord, Sierra Club v.
Hardin, 2 Env. Rep. Cas. 1385 (D. Alas. 1971).55Cohien v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), excused noncompliance
with the NEPA because of the necessity for expeditious action under the Economic Stabili-
zation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1971). A statement under the Federal-Aid
Highway Act was accepted in conjunction with an incomplete § 102 statement in Citizens
To Preserve Foster Park v. Volp, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1031 (N.D. Ind. 1971).5 See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), holding the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-81 (1970), inferior to the NEPA. Kalur v.
Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971), upheld the NEPA against the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, and Harrisburg Coalition v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971),
refused to accept a statement under the Federal-Aid Highway Act in satisfaction of the NEPA.
5 Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. May 23, 1972) (No. 1133); Port of New York Authority v. United
States, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.
v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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outlining agency discretion not to submit an impact statement. It would seem
almost axiomatic that an agency must have some measure of discretion to
define "major" actions and "significant" effects, but since the determination of
these facts cannot be divorced from their legal consequences," it is submitted
that any such discretion should be carefully scrutinized. When it appears that
environmental effects have been considered critically, particularly those of
projects begun before passage of the Act, there seems to be nothing to gain
from requiring a second environmental study. This same observation would
apply to studies made under other statutes, but only to the extent that such
studies are as broad as those mandated by the NEPA.
Procedure and Substance. The cases tend to support the following two prin-
ciples of judicial review:
(1) The courts have authority to determine whether or not the agency
has fully and in good faith observed the procedural requirements of the
NEPA; and,
(2) The courts have no authority to make a factual determination as to
the ultimate issue of whether a project should be undertaken or not.
These two issues may be conveniently denominated "procedural" and "sub-
stantive" review, and the generalization made that the courts can engage fully
in the former but are severely restricted in the latter. One should be wary of
such an overstatement, however, as procedural review involves a great deal
of substantive examination. Many courts which have emphatically denied their
own authority to engage in substantive review have nevertheless unhesitatingly
disagreed with findings of fact inherent in procedural compliance.
Most of the procedural requirements of the Act have been held subject to
more-or-less plenary judicial review. The court can insure that all environ-
mental impacts and adverse effects which may be known to the agency or
disclosed by responsible outside groups are reflected in the statement, as dic-
tated by section 102 (C) (i) and (ii)." The court can also require that all
possible alternatives be reflected and discussed in the statement."1 Agency
failure to circulate the statement for comments may be freely considered,"2
and the requirement that the statement accompany the proposal through the
agency review process can be rigidly enforced. 3
The major substantive issue within this procedural review has been whether
all the relevant factors were considered by the agency. This "relevant factor
test" emanates from Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n," in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that factors such as the recreational
value of a wild river and fish migration must be considered in determining
whether a dam was in the "public interest."" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
5" See text accompanying note 71 infra.
"See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs (Gillham), 325 F. Supp.
749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), injunction dissolved, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
61d.
'2See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170, 172
(D.D.C. 1972).
63See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'4387 U.S. 428 (1967).
"Section 7(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. S 800(b) (1971), required the
1972]
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Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n noted that each environ-
mental factor must be individually considered. Other cases have established
requirements that the impact statement reflect the "full range of responsible
opinion"" and "all known possible environmental consequences."' The courts
have not been hesitant in pointing out additional factors to be considered."
All alternatives, even those beyond the authority of the particular agency, must
likewise be enumerated."0 Once all the relevant factors and alternatives have
been considered by the agency, the requirements of the Act are satisfied, even
if such factors are ultimately ignored by the decision-makers. 1 To date, the
easiest technique for assuring procedural compliance has been to include in
the impact statement the depositions of the plaintiff's expert witnesses, thus
insuring that the very factors which will be brought to the court's attention
are considered in the statement."
The courts have uniformly recognized that judicial review of the ultimate
decision is narrow. Some courts have concluded that an agency decision can
be set aside only if the balance of cost and benefit is arbitrary and capricious,
or not supported by substantial evidence."5 Other courts have denied that the
power of substantive review exists at all."' The contention that the NEPA
creates any sort of substantive right to a clean environment has also been
uniformly rejected."
FPC to determine that a license to construct a private power plant would be in the "public
interest." Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, added a number of relevant factors, but
denied that he was expressing any opinion on the merits of the decision. 387 U.S. at 450.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, accused the Court of ignoring the substantial evidence rule and
substituting its judgment for that of the FPC. Id. at 454. In Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Court rejected the substantial evidence test and
adopted an "arbitrary and capricious" standard for review of a determination under the
Federal-Aid Highway Act that no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of park land
for highway construction existed. Despite the standard, the Court noted that an agency de-
cision would be subjected to a "probing, in-depth review." Id. at 415. The lead from the
Supreme Court is thus something less than clear.
6449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
'" Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs (Gillham), 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D.
Ark. 1971), injunction dissolved, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).6
1See, e.g., id. at 757-58.
"
0Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1972);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs (Gillham), 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971), injunction dissolved, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
71 See, e.g., the decision dissolving the Gillham injunction, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.
Ark. 1972). See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2453 (1972), involving the "public
interest" provision of the Federal Power Act. The Second Circuit in 1965 had reversed the
decision of the FPC to construct the Storm King nuclear power plant and remanded for
consideration of additional relevant factors. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966). The FPC recited its consideration of each factor and alternative men-
tioned in the remand, and was victorious in the subsequent action despite accusations that
it was "rubber stamping" the remand. Virtually no changes were made in the plans be-
tween the 1965 remand and the 1971 decision. The court declined to apply the NEPA,
noting that its earlier order had required the same sort of balancing procedure now necessary
under the Act. 453 F.2d at 481.
" Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 4 Env. Rep.
Cas. 1045 (4th Cir. 1972).
7 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).74 United States v. 247.37 Acres, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971).75 Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. May 23, 1972) (No. 1133); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608
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Several cases have intimated that a different standard of review may apply
to ongoing projects. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers (Gill-
ham)"9 said that "defendants may approach the problem of the ongoing project
differently from a new project, but the procedural result should be essentially
the same in both cases."" The court was willing to waive extensive hearings
and accept "any reasonable approach" which included the detailed impact
statement. It should be noted, however, that this requirement approximates
what the Act would require under any circumstances. Morningside-Lennox
Park Association v. Volpe' echoed this willingness to accept a different ap-
proach to ongoing projects "so long as the 'detailed statement' requirement
and other requirements of Section 102 are met."7 Since both cases exact full
procedural compliance, and the scope of substantive review is narrow under
any circumstances, it is submitted that neither of these cases offers much com-
fort to those responsible for ongoing projects.
The real objective which most environmental suits seek is a redistribution of
decision-making authority between the agencies and the courts. One author
notes that "[tihe true environmental challenge is the question whether we will
maintain the existing system of administrative regulatory agency monopoliza-
tion over implementation of the public interest, a system so dominant that
most lawyers and legislators accept it as obvious and inevitable."" When
the Act was first passed, some commentators thought that such a reallocation
had been accomplished. " Later authors have recognized that no such compul-
sion exists, and have challenged the effectiveness of the Act."' Serious criticism
of the present decision-making system and recommendations for change con-
tinue to be made, although not without some rebuttal from those who fear
uncontrolled expansion of judicial control over the environment.
The Case for a Broader Scope of Review. The attack on the status quo comes
from two directions. Many writers ascribe a presumption of bad faith to any
agency action.' A well-known conservationist lawyer notes that while in the
1930's and 1940's the agencies were considered the liberal forum for the
protection of personal rights, now liberals look to the courts to free them from
administrative agencies." The same author notes that in the few years of en-
vironmental litigation, "the courts have been the main protector of the environ-
ment and the main spokesman for the public interest. The main enemies have
(10th Cir. 1971); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
'325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
7Id. at 756-57.
79334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971).79 Id. at 145.
"Sax, New Directions in the Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 2 (C. Hassett ed. 1971).
81 J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra note 8, at 126. Without the benefit of two years of
decided cases, these authors interpreted S 101 as compelling the agencies to decide in favor
of environmental quality.
2 See, e.g., Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?,
37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 139 (1970); Note, NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury . . . ?, 6 U.
RICH. L. REV. 116 (1971).
"
3 See, e.g., Douglas, The Public Be Damned, PLAYBOY, July 1969, at 143. Douglas
refers to the Army Corps of Engineers as "public enemy number one" due to their "obses-
sion for building dams, whether needed or not." Id.
84 Sive, supra note 8, at 30.
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been the somewhat provincial single-interest administrative agencies.""
Other objections are directed at the system rather than at the agencies them-
selves. One writer points out the imbalance of resources in environmental
litigation-the ad hoc conservationist group facing the unlimited resources of
the agency (and often interested corporations) is "David facing Goliath" in
a suit commenced "in the shadow of the bulldozer"---and opines that this
fact alone should necessitate a more flexible review." Other objections are
leveled at the nature of agency determination. It is claimed that cost-benefit
analysis ignores the crucial equitable question of who should pay, a decision
which should be made through the legal and political processes."
It is generally agreed that the greatest obstacle to the environmentalist is
posed by the substantial evidence rule. One author makes the following ob-
servation on the operation of the rule:
[T]he number of agency decisions concerning the environment with which
the courts will interfere will be few if any. In environmental cases, the calls
to be made are so close that it is almost certain that an agency's decisions will
be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, yet may result
in irreparable harm to the environment. For example, if a numerical value
could be assigned to the amount of evidence, substantial evidence on the record
as a whole could mean a decision supported by as little as 25 or 30 per cent of
the evidence.u
As an example, the author notes that both sides in the Alaska pipeline con-
troversy are supported by "substantial" evidence. The same point is made in
respect to the Mineral King Mountain resort complex attacked in Sierra Club
v. Morton.88 Both sides represent valid claims to the use of land, "each
grounded upon values which society seeks to preserve in its environment."9
These authors make the very valid point that review of a fairly balanced de-
cision under the substantial evidence rule will inevitably lead to a result in the
deciding agency's favor.
The majority of the commentators favor some expansion of the scope of
review in environmental cases. A trend toward broader review is noted in the
"relevant factor test" of Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n.9 ' This approach
may be justified under existing standards of review by three alternate theories:
(1) the categorization approach, which states that the interpretation of un-
settled statutory provisions and the application of relatively new and undefined
legal standards is a question of law; (2) the analytical approach, which states
that an assertion of fact, such as "in the public interest," cannot be separated
from its legal consequence, and is thus fully reviewable by the court; and (3)
5 Id. at 21. See also Sax, supra note 80, at 8.
"' Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative
Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 617-19 (1970).
87 J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra note 8, at 20-2 1. Another author has attacked agency
expertise, noting that the major issues of environmental law are not questions of technical
expertise, but rather broad innovative matters of policy. Sax, supra note 80, at 3-8.
88 Comment, Preservation of the Environment Through the Doctrines Governing Judicial
Review of Administrative Agencies, 15 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 429, 437 (1971).
8"92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of En-
vironmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1070, 1084 (1970).
1 Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1966).
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the practical approach, which favors deferral to whichever tribunal is more
qualified to deal with the question."' While the suggested methods vary, these
authors uniformly feel that a change in the scope of review is essential to the
effective solution of the environmental crisis."
III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE ACT
The scope of permissible review having been determined, it is necessary to
examine judicial response to the particular issue of application of the Act to
projects which were in various stages of planning or construction at its effec-
tive date of January 1, 1970. The issue is likely to be around for quite a while,
as most major federal projects are in the planning stage for a number of years
and are not likely to attract public attention until a fairly advanced stage of
development is reached.
A. The Act Itself and Its Implementing Regulations
The words of the statute itself shed relatively little light on the issue of
retroactive application. Section 101 emphasizes "all practicable means and
measures" are to be taken to protect the environment, while the phrase "to
the fullest extent possible" modifies (or illuminates) the requirements of section
102. While these phrases have been interpreted to indicate both retroactivity"
and nonretroactivity," neither conclusion can be said to be compelled by the
Act. It is evident that the statute is not made expressly retroactive; however,
it omits the traditional "grandfather" clause often inserted to insure that
retroactive application is not read into a law. The legislative history is equally
unenlightening, containing little more than the hope that agencies will not
attempt to evade its mandates by a "narrow" construction."
The Guidelines" published by the Council on Environmental Quality ap-
proach the retroactivity issue in a somewhat more direct manner. The Guide-
lines state that the Act is to be applied to "further major federal acts," even
though they arise from projects initiated prior to its effective date. The Guide-
lines accept the fact that reassessment of the basic course of action will not al-
ways be possible, but caution that in such cases further incremental major
actions should be planned so as to minimize environmental damage and take
into account factors not fully evaluated at the outset of the project. The
language of the Guidelines indicates that the Council, at least, did not envision
full retroactivity.
B. The Theories of the Cases
Since the question of retroactive application is not definitely answered by
92 Sive, supra note 86, at 621-29. See also Comment, supra note 88, at 438.
"3 For a discussion of the logic on the other side of the fence, see Note, The Role
of the Court in Protecting the Environment-A Jurisprudential Analysis, 23 S.C.L. REV.
93, 113 (1971).
94 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs (Gillham), 325 F. Supp.
749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), injunction dissolved, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
' Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1421 (3d Cir.
1971).
9 CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 9-10 (1965).




the statute itself, the legislative history, or the implementing regulations, it
has been the subject of a good many conflicting judicial decisions. At least
three lines of cases are distinguishable, although it is often difficult to place
a particular decision in a particular category. The Act has been held to be
both nonretroactive and fully retroactive, while an "incremental action" theory
has been used to justify holdings in both categories."
Nonretroactive. Several courts have passed directly on the issue of retroactivity.
The leading case in favor of nonretroactivity to date is Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Council v. Bartlett." Pennsylvania approved a plan to improve an
existing road in 1967. Notice was given and an opportunity for interested
parties to be heard was offered. A location study was made in 1968, with ex-
tensive cooperation between the Highway Department and state conservation
agencies. The project was approved by the Secretary of Transportation in
November 1969. Contracts were awarded prior to January 1, 1970, and con-
struction began soon thereafter.'" The district court held that the Act would
not be applied retroactively to require an impact statement. The court also con-
cluded that the NEPA would not apply at all to federal approval of highway
location; to do so "not only would place a staggering burden on the Secretary,
but also would cause him to duplicate state investigations and determina-
tions. '"101
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to apply the Act. The
court noted that both the Secretary of Interior's approval of the project, and
the awarding of contracts, preceded the effective date of the Act. The only
remaining federal action following passage of the Act was the inspection of
the completed highway. The court observed that "[flor all practical purposes,
therefore, final federal action on the project took place prior to January 1,
1970 ....102 The court examined the NEPA and found that "[there is no
evidence of a congressional intention that the Act be applied retroactively to
reopen decisions which had become final before [the effective] date."'" A con-
trary intent was found in the "fullest extent possible" language of section 102.
The court said that this case was not one in which discretionary federal action
took place in stages, only part of which were prior to the Act. Because final
federal approval (and, consequently, final federal action) were prior to the
Act, the Act would not apply.'"
Other cases have expounded on the retroactivity issue. Some have agreed
that congressional failure to make the Act explicitly retroactive was deter-
minative, particularly since Congress must have been aware of the large
number of incomplete projects in existence when the Act was passed.' One
9 See notes 131, 132 infra, and accompanying text.
99454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
'"The facts are set out in the district court opinion, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
201 Id. at 249.
10 454 F.2d at 624.
103 Id.
10' In accord is a recent decision of the same court, Concerned Citizens of Marlboro, Inc.
v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1972).
'Brooks v. Volpe, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd and remanded, 3 Env.
Rep. Cas. 1858 (9th Cir. 1972); Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass. 1971).
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court made retroactive application contingent upon substantial deviation from
pre-Act plans.' Others have urged a comparison of the likelihood of a change
in plans with the cost of a delay in construction.'" The point has been made
that an intent on the part of Congress to repudiate former decisions to
authorize projects now in the construction phase should not be inferred too
readily from the NEPA.'"
The most recent case directly on point is Green County Planning Board v.
Federal Power Comm'n."' The plaintiffs challenged completion of a power
line which had been licensed in 1969. Construction was eighty percent com-
plete. The Second Circuit considered both Gillham, the leading case for full
retroactivity, and Calvert Cliffs', the leading case for the incremental action
theory. The court concluded that "we see no basis for applying NEPA retro-
actively to the licensing of the basic project which became final nearly six
months prior to the effective date of the Act.""' The significance of this case
is that it was decided after the major judicial trends were fairly well-defined.
The Second Circuit expressly rejected the full retroactivity and incremental
action theories, and indicated its approval of the nonretroactive interpretation
of Bartlett."'
"° San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
"' Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 Env. Rep. Cas. 1160 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd,
459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp.
1038 (D. Ore. 1970).
"' Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970).
2-455 F.2d 412 (2d Cit. 1972), appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3010 (U.S. June 8,
1972) (No. 71-1597).
nId. at 424.
n But see Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S.
Mar. 28, 1972) (No. 71-1198), where it was indicated in dictum that the NEPA would
be applied only prospectively. The Supreme Court had previously denied certiorari in a
related case which resulted in a Fifth Circuit decision that the San Antonio Conservation
Society did not have standing to sue for an injunction to stop the project. It is interesting
to note the language in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. Justice Black dissented on
the ground that "approval of the two end segments took place in August 1970, eight months
after the effective date of the Act." San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 400 U.S. 968, 969 (1971) (denying certiorari). Justice Douglas, also dissenting,
noted that "11 months after the Environmental Policy Act became effective, the gist of the
location problem so far as the park is concerned had not been resolved." Id. at 976. Justice
Douglas accepted the date of "unqualified approval" as determinative. Justice Brennan
joined in both dissents. These three justices would appear to be the most concerned with the
environment, judging from their dissents, yet none expressed any belief that the Act should
be retroactively applied.
Nevertheless, in the suit by the individual members of the conservation society, the
Fifth Circuit took the position that the state could not complete the project even if it did
so without federal funds. The court said that allowing the state to complete the road with
its own money would be "giving approval to the circumvention of an Act of Congress. The
North Expressway is now a federal project, and it has been a federal project since the Sec-
cretary of Transportation authorized federal participation .... ." 446 F.2d at 1027. Judge
Clark, dissenting on this point, said that since no funds had changed hands, this was "more
nearly a proposal than a marriage," id. at 1029, and contended that the court could not
enjoin state construction if the state made an unqualified renouncement of federal funds.
In accord with the Fifth Circuit decision is La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221
(N.D. Cal. 1971), which held that state officials must comply with the NEPA concerning
a highway for which the state intended to seek federal funds, even though such funds had
not yet been appropriated. An interesting case taking the opposite view is Gibson v. Ruckels-
haus, 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1028 (E.D. Tex. 1971), in which a district court stated that it
would dissolve an injunction against the condemnation of land for a sewage disposal plant
if the city would abandon federal funding. In accord with this view is Civic Improvement
Comm. v. Volpe, 4 Env. Rep. Cas. 1160 (W.D.N.C.), aft'd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cit. 1972),
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Fully Retroactive. An impressive number of courts have either expressly stated
that the NEPA is fully retroactive or have applied the Act to projects begun
before its effective date by using other theories.
By far the most innovative case to date under the NEPA is Environmental
Defense Fund v., Corps of Engineers (Gillham)."' Gillham Dam was a part
of a larger project for flood control and reservoir construction on Arkansas'
Little River. The overall project was authorized by Congress in 1958. Con-
struction begin in 1965. As of January 1, 1970, over nine million dollars
of the projected fourteen-million-dollar cost of the Gillham complex had
been expended. Although construction of the actual dam had not begun, re-
lated facilities such as spillways and outlet sluices were complete or substan-
tially complete by 1970. The dam would create a lake on the Cossatot River,
and would result in fairly definite flood control and water supply benefits as
well as undeniable environmental and recreational costs.
The court seemed to be offended by the fact that the Corps gave the im-
pression that had no work been done on the project, they "would be approach-
ing the environmental impact statement with a different, more open-minded,
attitude.""' 8 The decision quoted section 9 of the environmental statement,
which noted that it was no longer practical to reassess the basic project, thus
any restudy would be "almost certain to reaffirm the original decision."... The
court said that it was "not suggesting that the status of the work should not be
considered in determining whether to proceed with the project ... [But] the
degree of the completion of the work should not inhibit the objective and
thorough evaluation of the environmental impact of the project as required by
the NEPA.""' The Act was read to compel federal agencies "to objectively
evaluate all of their projects, regardless of how much money has already been
spent thereon and regardless of the degree of completion of the work.""' The
duty was described as a "continuing action" to study and improve plans"' and
"determining [whether] to go forward with the project, abandon the project,
or restudy the whole matter."'
The court justified retroactive application of the Act in several ways. First,
it questioned whether application under the circumstances was in fact retro-
active: "[Hlere the plaintiffs are not asking the Court to set aside or undo any
prior action on the part of the defendants. Rather, they are seeking an appli-
cation of prevailing, existing law related to anticipated future actions of the
defendants."'' 9 The decision then took cognizance of the language of section
101(b), which creates a continuing duty to improve federal plans, and the
which held the NEPA inapplicable to a highway project neither financed nor controlled
by the federal government.
"'325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971), injunction dissolved, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.
Ark. 1972).
111325 F. Supp. at 745.
11 Id. at 745-46.
"id. at 746.
"'Id. In accord with the view that the NEPA applies to all projects upon which sub-
stantial action is yet to be taken are Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F.
Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972), and Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 3 Env. Rep.
Cas. 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1971).





directive of section 102 that the policy is to be implemented to the fullest
extent possible. Thus, the same language which Bartlett had found to dictate
a pragmatic and flexible approach was held to impose an absolute duty to
comply with the procedural requirements of the Act.
The underlying reason for the court's decision is its concept of the purpose of
the NEPA: "At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law.
The Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to alter the then existing
decision-making responsibilities or to take away any then existing freedom of
decision-making, but it certainly intended to make such decision-making more
responsive and more responsible."'' 0 If the NEPA is in fact nothing more than
a full disclosure law, the court's theory of full retroactivity is correct. At least
one author would agree that, because of the technical complexity of the class
of environmental threat to which the NEPA was directed, the impetus should
be toward recognizing and classifying the problems rather than assigning
relative costs and seeking solutions.1"'
Calvert Cliffs' could be cited for either the full retroactivity theory or the
incremental action concept. The plaintiffs attacked AEC rules which permitted
the issuance of licenses for construction of power plants without an impact
statement; the requirements of the NEPA were being imposed only with
respect to applications for operating licenses.' The plaintiffs objected par-
ticularly to an atomic power plant on Chesapeake Bay. The construction per-
mit had been issued prior to the Act, and under the AEC rules no environ-
mental study would be made until the application for an operating permit was
received.
The court struck down the AEC rules, noting that it was clear from the Act
that any action taken after its effective date must comply with the procedural
requirements. The court acknowledged that the NEPA may not require instant
compliance, but "it must at least require that NEPA procedures, once estab-
lished, be applied to consider prompt alterations in the plans or operations of
facilities approved without compliance."" The phrase "approved without
compliance" is not limited to approval after the effective date of the Act.
The decision considered the "substantive" duties of section 101 (b) to be quali-
fied by the phrase "all practicable means, consistent with other essential con-
siderations," but concluded that section 102 duties "are not inherently flexible.
They must be complied with to the fullest extent possible, unless there is a
clear conflict of statutory authority. Considerations of administrative difficulty,
delay or economic cost will not suffice to strip the section of its fundamental
importance."'24 This interpretation of the Act led the court to conclude that
the AEC must consider environmental factors in the prelicensing stage, before
an irreversible commitment of resources had restricted the available options.
The court made a pro forma denial that requiring an impact statement at this
stage was tantamount to retroactive application, since the project would have
10 Id. at 759.
122 Rathjens, supra note 14, at 38-42.
.22 10 C.F.R. app. D, at 246-50 (1970). Rule (4) provided that environmental factors
would be considered only in hearings for which notice was published after Mar. 4, 1971.
... 449 F.2d at 1121, citing Gillham.
" 
4 1d. at 1115.
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to pass the test of the NEPA before going into full operation anyway. "All
we demand is that the environmental review be as full and fruitful as pos-
sible."'"
The crux of the opinion was contained in two footnotes. The court clari-
fied its holding when it noted that:
[T]he Commission must promptly consider the environmental impact of
projects initially approved before January 1, 1970, but not granted an op-
erating license. We hold that the Commission may not wait until construction
is entirely completed and consider environmental factors only at the operating
license hearings; rather, before environmental damage has been irreparably
done by full construction of a facility, the Commission must consider alterations
in the plans."'
Another footnote distinguished many of the previously discussed cases:
"The courts which have held NEPA to be nonretroactive have not faced situ-
ations like the one before us here--situations where there are two, distinct
stages of federal approval, one occurring before the Act's effective date and one
after that date.'
1 7
This case demonstrates the difficulty one encounters in classifying the cases
under the NEPA. The court expressly denied that it was applying the Act
retroactively, yet it required an impact statement on a project approved and
presumably begun prior to the effective date, basing its decision on the existence
of a second "major" increment. Calvert Cliffs' may thus be said to support
all three theories, although the rather self-serving assertion that application of
the Act was not retroactive can be readily dismissed. The actual holding of
the case must be said to support the fully retroactive theory, while the par-
ticular facts of the case lend support to the incremental action concept.
Several courts have applied a "balancing of factors" test to projects begun
before the Act. The Fourth Circuit in Arlington Coalition v. Volpe, holding
that an impact statement was required for a highway project planned before
the Act's effective date, noted that "[slection 102(c) is applicable to a pro-
ject until it has reached the state of completion where the costs of abandoning
or altering the proposed route would clearly outweigh the benefits there-
from."" Since construction contracts had not yet been let, the court found
that application of the Act was warranted and not retroactive under the cir-
cumstances. This case expressly approved the nonretroactivity theory of Bart-
lett, but applied NEPA to a project initiated before the Act. Environmental
Law Fund v. Volpe,"9 however, expressly declined to follow Bartlett and re-
fused to apply NEPA to a similar project. The latter case interpreted NEPA
to require an impact statement on an ongoing project only if "practicable."
Four factors of practicability were set out: community participation in plan-
ning; state efforts to protect the environment; likely environmental harm;
and cost of delay. Balancing these factors, the court concluded that compli-
ance with the Act in this case would be impracticable, and declined to issue
12,'d, at 1129.
"'ld. at 1121 n.28.
'Id. at 1129 n.4 3.
M2 3 Env. Rep. Cas. 1995, 2001 (4th Cir. 1972).
"9340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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an injunction. Jacarilla Apache Tribe v.. Morton," which declined to enjoin
construction of the Four Corners power plant, noted that an impact state-
ment will be required for an ongoing project only when it is "practicable" to
reassess the basic course of action. The common denominator of these cases
is that each predicates application of NEPA on the presence or absence of
various pragmatic factors rather than upon an examination of the calendar.
Incremental Actions. The incremental action theory had its origin in the
Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, which provide generally that
the NEPA is to apply to "further major federal acts" even though the basic
project was initiated prior to the Act. The Guidelines note that even when it
is not possible to reassess the basic course of action, "it is still important that
further incremental major actions be shaped so as to minimize adverse environ-
mental consequences."'' The heading of this section is somewhat misleading,
as no case has actually accepted the import of the Guidelines without some
modifications.
Gillham cited the Guidelines with approval, noting that the actual exten-
sion of the dam across the Cossatot River was such an incremental action. How-
ever, it is evident that Gillham did not in fact accept the incremental theory,
as it stated that the most glaring deficiency in the defendant's conduct was the
failure to consider the alternative of leaving the Cossatot alone. Under the
incremental theory the Corps should have considered the alternatives in com-
pleting the project. The possibility of a dly dam or embankments of various
designs would have to be evaluated, but not the alternative of no dam at all.
Calvert Cliffs' approaches being a correct application of the theory. The
court noted that cases holding the Act to be nonretroactive have not faced
situations "where there are two, distinct stages of federal approval, one occurr-
ing before the Act's effective date and one after that date."'32 The "basic" proj-
ect was the construction of a power plant; the "major incremental action"
was the issuance of the operating permit. The court, while striking down many
of the AEC's rules, did not enjoin construction of the Calvert Cliffs' plant;
it only suggested that the AEC take such action pending an environmental
review. The Calvert Cliffs' situation is somewhat unique, in that the incremen-
tal action-the issuance of an operating license-was not to occur until
several years after the granting of the construction license. The court refused
to allow the AEC to wait until that date to make the environmental study,
fearing that by that time the previous commitment of resources would limit
the available options. In this regard, the court departed from a strict applica-
tion of the incremental theory, but it did so with good reason. When there
must necessarily be a second stage in the approval process, involving a second
distinct and identifiable federal decision, it would seem that an agency should
not be able to evade the purpose of the NEPA by waiting until any change
in position is economically impossible. It should be noted, however, that the
application of this theory is somewhat narrow. It should only be applied when
1303 Env. Rep. Cas. 1919 (D. Ariz. 1972).
.3 36 Fed. Reg. 1398 (1971); see note 97 supra, and accompanying text.
112449 F.2d at 1129 n.43.
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there are distinct stages of decision-making. A highway designed before the
Act, for example, does not require a second "major" federal decision to be put
into operation. Even construction of an integrated phase of a larger project,
such as the embankment in Gillham, is not a separate and distinct event which
would allow application of the incremental theory. The second limiting factor
is that environmental consideration extends only to the incremental action
and not to the basic project. The alternative of no project at all will not
generally be available under this theory. It would seem that in situations to
which the theory does apply, there is a great deal of merit in the Calvert Cliffs'
position-that an agency must make the environmental study while alterna-
tives are still available.
IV. A SUGGESTED JUDICIAL POLICY
At the outset, it should be noted that the NEPA should be interpreted as
an agency-regulating statute rather than an environmental full disclosure
law." The concept of full disclosure can scarcely be applied in the context of
environmental protection, where the potential harm is to the public sector, and,
even with full knowledge of the facts, the public can prevent the harm only
through the agency. Major federal actions normally have a built-in delay
period, as the planning and hearing stages usually span several years. However,
the concept of a forced delay is particularly inappropriate to ongoing projects,
since it seems axiomatic that a project once begun should be either shelved or
completed with minimum delay and cost. Few plaintiffs would contend that
they were surprised by the commencement of the project, since normally the
opposition to the project spans many years. Conservationists themselves are
quick to point out that administrative agencies have no monoply on the exper-
tise required to ferret out and evaluate the effects of their projects. One author
notes that the difficulty in evaluating the merits of the typical federal project
is not from a lack of material, but rather from an overabundance of technical
data."4 Because the problems of the environment are so complicated, it is
doubtful that the data on any one project could be meaningfully condensed
into an easily understood summary. Even if disclosure were the primary pur-
pose of the Act, it is doubtful that it would be that beneficial to the fight for
a better environment.
As a law regulating agency decision-making, the NEPA comes face to face
with an inescapable fact of life-when a court cannot meaningfully review an
agency decision, there is little point in requiring a procedure which will not
change that decision. Despite the criticism of conservationists, the engineers
in the various agencies are naturally quick to defend their own decisions and
the importance of their projects. A member of the staff of the Council on
Environmental Quality notes that once highway construction reaches a certain
stage, it is highly unlikely that the basic course of action will be reassessed,
and therefore concludes that the application of the Act at this stage would be
131The concept of a disclosure law immediately brings to mind the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78ff (1970).114Drew, supra note 9, at 55. Note the 1350-page impact statement submitted in Gill-
ham. 342 F. Supp. at 1212 n.1.
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impractical."' An engineer, writing on this subject, reached this conclusion:
"In selecting highway alternatives, there is always the temptation to opt for
the 'no highway' alternative. While it is always appropriate to consider that
possibility, in most cases the environmental costs will be high. Bad transporta-
tion is bad for the environment."'' 3 This philosophy explains why the road
was designed in the first place, and it explains why the decision once made
will be justified despite environmental considerations. The attitude that the
public will be better served by completion of an in-progress project is natural,
understandable, and in many cases justified. Since it appears that the NEPA
does nothing to shift the decision-making power from these agencies, it is
submitted that to apply the procedural requirements of the Act to a project
upon which a final decision has been made is to require futile and useless
exertion. Once a project has reached the point where all discretionary action
has been completed, the NEPA should not be applied.
This is not to say that projects initiated before the Act are completely im-
mune from its provisions. There is a great practical difference between making
a decision and justifying a decision already made. When a major incremental
decision must be made, the Act should require that it be made with full con-
sideration of its environmental effects. Because of the vastness of the environ-
mental problems to which the NEPA was addressed, a major effort should be
made to identify and classify the consequences of environmental decisions,
even though the limited scope of review will preclude judicial control of the
decision. It is submitted that of all the cases studied, Calvert Cliffs' is the
closest to a meaningful and effective application of the Act. When further
incremental decisions must be made, the Act should guide the decision-makers.
As Calvert Cliffs' pointed out, if the further action is inevitable but fairly dis-
tant, the environmental study should be made before economic costs become
so great that environmental factors must be subordinated. It should be reiter-
ated that this theory applies only to a second, distinct discretionary action,
and is primarily concerned with the minimization of the effects of the second
decision rather than a reassessment of the entire project.
There is, of course, a great deal of merit in the contentions of those who
favor full application of the Act and a shift in the balance of decision-making
power. If the latter could be accomplished, then the former might be appro-
priate. Since the NEPA has not changed the basic structure of the decision-
making process, its application should be limited to those instances in which
it will be effective, and conservationists must wait for new and broader legis-
lation to satisfy their demands for a more active role in the effort to protect
and preserve the environment."7
" Reilly, supra note 15.
136 Koltnow, Changing Highway Priorities: Construction, Economy, and Environmental
Improvement, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 119, 130 (1970).
1"7 For a different perspective on the problem and a contrary solution, see 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 805 (1971), in which the author concludes that the NEPA will reach its full potential
only if applied retroactively; and Note, Retroactive Application of the NEPA, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 732 (1971), in which it was concluded that the Act was meant to be applied
retroactively to some degree, but would deny application when the particular project is
beyond the point where useful results can be obtained. Both articles also discuss the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of retroactive application, which has been assumed in this
Comment.
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